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Abstract
Bayesian methods suffer from the problem of how to specify prior beliefs.
One interesting idea is to consider worst-case priors. This requires solving
a stochastic zero-sum game. In this paper, we extend well-known results
from bandit theory in order to discover minimax-Bayes policies and discuss
when they are practical.
1 Introduction
In this work, we consider the problem of a Bayesian agent interacting with a Markov decision
process (MDP). However the agent is unsure of how to select its prior distribution and so
it prefers a choice that is safe against a potentially adversarial Nature. The problem is how
to select such a policy in a computationally efficient manner. We first recall the definition
of an MDP.
Definition 1. A Markov decision process µ ∈ M on a state-action space S × A is a tuple
〈S,A, P, ρ, T 〉 where S is a set of states, A is a set of actions, P is a transition kernel, such
that
st+1 | st = s, at = a ∼ P
s,a,
where rt = ρ(st) and T is a (potentially random) horizon.
The agent’s utility is an additive function of individual rewards rt ∈ R
U ,
T∑
t=1
rt. (1)
For simplicity, we can assume that the reward function is known to the agent and then for
a finite state space ρ can be taken to be a fixed vector. For any MDP µ ∈ M and policy
π ∈ Π, the expected utility is Eπµ(U), while the conditional expected utility is called the
value function:
V πµ (s) , E
π
µ
(
T∑
t=1
rt
∣∣∣∣∣ st = s
)
. (2)
For finite MDPs, and a (1− γ)-geometrically distributed horizon T , the value function can
be written as a vector V πµ = (I − γP
π
µ )
−1ρ, where P πµ is the Markov chain induced on
the MDP by the policy π. Since we are uncertain about µ, we can instead define a prior
distribution ξ on M. Then
V πξ ,
∫
M
V πµ dξ(µ), (3)
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will denote the value function under the particular distribution ξ on the MDPs. Finally,
for a given probability measure β on S, which can be taken to represent a starting state
distribution, we define the utility of a particular policy π to be:
U(ξ, π) , Eπξ (β
⊤V πµ ) =
∫
M
β⊤V πµ dξ(µ). (4)
There are two possible ways to interpret the measure ξ, depending on how it is chosen. If
ξ is selected by the agent selecting π, then it corresponds to the subjective belief of the
decision maker about which is the most likely MDP a priori. Then U(ξ, π) corresponds to
the expected utility of a particular policy under this belief. Let
U∗(ξ) , sup
π∈Π
U(ξ, π) (5)
denote the Bayes-optimal utility for a belief. We recall the fact that this is a convex func-
tion [c.f. DeGroot, 1970]. By definition, and due to convexity, the following bounds hold:
U(ξ, π) ≤ U∗(ξ) ≤
∫
ξ
U∗(µ) dξ(µ), ∀π ∈ Π. (6)
In the above, the left hand side is the utility of an arbitrary policy, while the right side can
be seen as the expected utility we would obtain if the true MDP was revealed to us.
The second view of ξ is to assume that the MDP is actually drawn randomly from the
distribution ξ. If this is known, then the subjective value of a policy is equal to its true
expected value. However, it is more interesting to consider the case where Nature selects
some ξ in an arbitrary way from a set of possible priors Ξ. Then we wish to find a policy
π∗ achieving:
max
π∈Π
min
ξ∈Ξ
U(ξ, π). (7)
One basic open question is whether the maximum exists. This is answered in the affirmative
when the game between nature and the agent has a value, i.e.
U∗ = sup
π∈Π
inf
ξ∈Ξ
U(ξ, π) = inf
ξ∈Ξ
sup
π∈Π
U(ξ, π) = U∗. (8)
Let π∗ and ξ∗ be the maximin policy and minimax prior respectively. If the game has a
value then there exists an equalising policy which is optimal for some belief ξ∗, and vice
versa. A sufficient condition for this to occur is for U∗ to be convex and differentiable
everywhere [c.f. Gru¨nwald and Dawid, 2004]. In order to study when this can occur, we
first go over a couple of well-known facts.
2 Existence of maximin policies
Definition 2 (Policy). Let H be the set of all histories (st, at−1). A (stochastic) policy π
is a set of probability measures {π(· | h) | h ∈ H} on the set of actions A. We denote the
set of all (history-dependent, stochastic) policies by ΠS.
Definition 3 (Deterministic policy). A policy is deterministic if, for each sequence st, at−1,
there exists an action a ∈ A such that π(at = a | st, at−1) = 1. We denote the set of
deterministic policies by ΠD.
Definition 4 (Memoryless policy). A policy is memoryless (or reactive) if, for all sequences
st, at−1, we have π(at = a | st, at−1) = π(at = a | st). We denote the set of memoryless
(stochastic) policies by ΠS1 .
The set of memoryless deterministic policies is denoted by ΠD1 . Obviously, Π
D
1 ⊂ Π
D ⊂ ΠS
and ΠD1 ⊂ Π
S
1 ⊂ Π
S.
Definition 5 (Mixed policy). A mixed policy is a probability measure over policies. If Π is
a set of base policies, we denote the set of probability measures over Π by ∆(Π).
Fact 1. For any MDP µ there exists a deterministic, memoryless policy that is optimal, i.e.
U∗(µ) = supπ∈Π U(µ, π) = maxπ∈ΠD1 U(ξ, π).
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Fact 2. For any distribution ξ over MDPs, there exists a deterministic, history-dependent
policy that is optimal, i.e. U∗(ξ) = supπ∈Π U(ξ, π) = maxπ∈ΠD U(ξ, π)
A well-known game theoretic result is that an equalising policy can always be found in ∆(Π)
when Π is finite. However for fixed, finite T , there may not exist a deterministic equalising
policy. Then the number of possible policies is finite and consequently U∗ is piecewise-linear.
Remark 1. If ΠD is finite, there exists a policy π∗ ∈ ΠS achieving the value of the game.
Proof. For any mixed policy δ ∈ ∆(ΠD), there exists an equivalent stochastic policy in ΠS.
This can be constructed by augmenting the state space to include the outcomes of fair coins.
Now note that there exists an optimal mixed strategy δ∗ ∈ ∆(ΠD) achieving the value of
the game, as the number of finite-horizon policies is finite. But there also exists a stochastic
policy with the same distribution for all histories h ∈ H. 
Gru¨nwald and Dawid [2004] make some interesting connections between maximum entropy
and robust Bayesian decisions. In particular, they define the generalised entropy of a distri-
bution ξ to be minimum loss H(ξ) , infπ L(P, π) achievable in a game between nature and
a decision maker. In our setting, it is natural to consider the following two loss functions:
L1(ξ, π) = β
⊤(V ∗ξ − V
π
ξ ), L2(ξ, π) = β
⊤
Eξ(V
∗
µ − V
π
µ ), (9)
where β ∈ R|S| is a distribution on the states. These corresponds to the regret of π relative to
the ξ-optimal policy and to the oracle policy respectively. Now, let Ξ be a set of probability
distributions onM. One idea is to try and guard against the worst-case prior in a restricted
set Ξφ, by constraining the expectation of a statistic Φ : M → R
k under the prior to be
equal to the observed value of the statistic, φ.
Ξφ = { ξ ∈ Ξ | Eξ(Φ) = φ } . (10)
One possibiltiy is to use the cumulative state distribution for a particular policy π, i.e.
Φ(µ) = (I − γP πµ )
−1, (11)
where a common choice for π is the optimal policy for MDP µ, π∗(µ), used for example
in Mannor and Shimkin [2003]. In that case it is easy to see that V ∗ξ = Eξ(Φ)ρ . A
sufficient condition for a policy π to be robust Bayes against Ξφ is for it to be linear, that is
L(µ, π) = α0+α
⊤Φ(µ) for all µ ∈M. Then it is also true [see Gru¨nwald and Dawid, 2004,
Theorem 7.1] that π is an equalising policy against Ξφ.
How can Ξφ be calculated? When the set of MDPs is finite, then it is defined through the
linear equation Ξφ =
{
ξ
∣∣∣ ∑µ ξ(µ)Φ(µ) = φ}. Given, then, a sequence of observations, a
statistic, and a resulting set of priors Ξφ, one important question is how we can efficiently
calculate such policies. We explain this in the following section.
3 Calculating robust policies
One potential solution involves finding the minimax prior ξ∗ and then the policy that is
Bayes-optimal with respect to it. In previous work Koolen [2006] has shown that finding
ξ∗ can be found via a concave-linear optimisation, for the ‘truth-finding’ game. However,
this is not generally true. However, it has been shown by Freund and Schapire [1999], that
multiplicative weighs algorithm can be used for zero-sum games, as long as an oracle that
can compute best responses is available. In our setting, this would correspond to nature
having the ability to efficiently construct a worst-case MDP given a policy. On the other
hand Vrieze and Tijs [1982] show that the value in stochastic zero sum games can be achieved
asymptotically via fictitious play even when the game matrix is known approximately, as
long as the approximation converges to the true game matrix.
One idea is to apply results from the experts literature, such as the weighted majority
algorithm (WMA). We start by assuming that in each round k the Decision Maker has full
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access to the information regarding the rewards of the past round. That means that she
can observe the outcomes of all the policies that were available previously.
Assume that |M| =M is finite1. Then and let vπ be the 1×M vector of values for policy
π for the given set of Markov decision problems M:
uπ = (U(µ, π))µ∈M .
Assume that |Π| = N is finite and denote by uξ the 1×N vector of values for each policy
uξ = (U(ξ, π))π∈Π .
To apply WMA (Alg. 2) we execute policies in rounds. At each round, we select a policy
π(k) from a distribution qk, and nature calculates chooses some prior ξ(k). Moreover, denote
by xπi,k the total realized reward obtained by following policy πi, i = 1, 2, ..., N , in the
k-th round. Each xπi,k is a random variable that has an expected value, equal to U(ξ, πi).
Finally, denote by x(k) the vector of sampled utilities of all policies up to round k:
x(k) = (xπ1,k, xπ2,k, . . . , xπN ,k).
Algorithm 1 WMA
Input: A set of policies π, with |π| = N ; a set of weights w(k) =
(
wi,k
)N
i=1
; a learning rate
0 < ℓ ≤ 1/2. Initialize: wi,1 = 1.
For each round k:
1: DM(Decision Maker) normalizes the weights to get a distribution qk =
w(k)∑
N
i=1 wi,k
2: DM selects π(k) among πi, i = 1, 2, ..., N according to the distribution qk
3: Nature chooses ξ(k) ∈ argminξ(k)Eqk
[
uξ(k)
]
4: DM receives reward xk,π(k) and calculates U(ξ(k), πi) for all policies πi ∈ π
5: DM calculates the next set of weights for i = 1, . . . , N :
wi,k+1 =
(
1 + ℓ U(ξ(k), πi)
)
wi,(k)
3.1 Analysis
The main issue is the computation of the value U(ξ(k), πi), which is used in steps 3 and 4.
Depending on the sizes of the policy and MDP space accurate or approximate values for the
quantity U(ξ(k), πi) can be obtained.
When N (number of policies) and M (number of MDPs) are small. Then we can
retrieve the expected value of each policy V πiµ =
(
I − γP πiµ
)−1
ρ, where P πiµ is the kernel.
The inverse operator will require O(|S|3). The expected reward for sampling a policy π
from the distribution qk is
Eπ∼qk [xk,π ] = x(k) · qk.
The total expected reward over all rounds is therefore
V
(K)
WMA ,
K∑
k=1
x(k) · qk.
Theorem 1 (Arora et al. [2012]). The Multiplicative Weights algorithm guarantees that
after K rounds, for any distribution Q on the decisions, it holds:
V
(K)
WMA
≥
K∑
k=1
(uξk − ℓ|uξk |) · Q −
logeN
ℓ
where |uξk | is the vector obtained by taking the coordinate-wise absolute value of the vector
containing the expected values V πiξk .
1If M = ∞, a grid over the MDPs can be used to obtain a finite set. Then the approximation
error for an MDP that has an ǫ-close transition matrix and mean reward from an MDP on the grid,
will be bounded by ǫ/(1− γ)2.
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If M is small, but N is large then computation of U(ξ(k), πi) becomes difficult. We
can approximate the true value of the expected values, though, by using a Monte Carlo
sampling of S iterations. We substitute U(ξ(k), πi) with its estimator Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S) (lines
3,4 & 5 of algorithm WMA) and we call this modification of the algorithm as WMA-SR.
Moreover, for each round k, we need to introduce an estimation error term E
(S)
(k) (which
depends on the number S of Monte Carlo iterations), since now the weights are updated by
using approximations and not the true values.
Algorithm 2 WMA-SR
Input: A set of policies π, with |π| = N ; a set of weights w(k) =
(
wi,k
)N
i=1
; a learning rate
0 < ℓ ≤ 1/2. Initialize: wi,1 = 1.
For each round k:
1: DM(Decision Maker) normalizes the weights to get a distribution qk =
w(k)∑
N
i=1 wi,k
2: DM selects π(k) among πi, i = 1, 2, ..., N according to the distribution qk
3: Nature chooses ξ(k) ∈ argminξ(k)Eqk
[
uξ(k)
]
4: DM receives reward xk,π(k) and calculates Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S) for all policies πi ∈ π
5: DM calculates the next set of weights for i = 1, . . . , N :
wi,k+1 =
(
1 + ℓ Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S)
)
wi,(k)
The value earned by using WMA-SR, over all rounds is
V
(K)
WMA-SR , E
(
K∑
k=1
x(k) · qk
)
=
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · qk
where qk = (qk,1, . . . , qk,N ).
First, we prove a lemma for the approximated expected values.
Lemma 1. Assume that all policy rewards lie in [−1, 1]. Let 0 < ℓ ≤ 12 . Then after K
rounds, it holds:
V
(K)
WMA-SR
≥
K∑
k=1
Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S)− ℓ
K∑
k=1
|Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S)| −
logeN
ℓ
for all i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Observe that if the rewards are not stochastic, then Lemma 1 is reduced to the standard
expert setting[Arora et al., 2012, Freund and Schapire, 1999, c.f].
Theorem 2. Assume that all policy rewards lie in [−1, 1]. Let 0 < ℓ ≤ 12 . Let ε > 0. Then
after K rounds, for the total expected rewards, it holds:
V
(K)
WMA-SR
≥
K∑
k=1
U(ξ(k), πi)− ℓ
K∑
k=1
|U(ξ(k), πi)| −
logeN
ℓ
−
K∑
k=1
E
(S)
(k)
for all i = 1, 2, ..., N , where ξ(k) = (ξ1,k, . . . , ξM,k),
∑
m ξm,k = 1, qk =
(q1,k, . . . , qN,k),
∑
i qi,k = 1, E
(S)
(k) is the error term of the k-th round (and S denotes the
number of Monte Carlo simulations):
E
(S)
(k) =
∣∣∣uξ(k) ·qk−U(ξ(k), πi)+ℓ|U(ξ(k), πi)|+logeNℓ −
(
uˆξ(k) · qk − Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S) + ℓ|Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S)|+
logeN
ℓ
) ∣∣∣
and
P
(∣∣∣∣∣
K∑
k=1
E
(S)
(k) < ε
∣∣∣∣∣
)
≥ 1− 2 exp
(
−k
ε2
2
)
.
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The error bound is retrieved by applying Azuma’s Lemma, since Uˆ(ξ(k), πi, S)−U(ξ(k), πi)
is a martingale difference and all rewards lie in [−1, 1]. We can also obtain a result for a
distribution P over πi’s, i = 1, 2, ..., N .
Corollary 1. After K rounds, for any distribution P ∈ RN×1 on the decisions, it holds:
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · qk ≥
K∑
k=1
(
uξ(k) − ℓ|uξ(k) |
)
· P −
logeN
ℓ
−
K∑
k=1
E
(S)
(k)
where |Vξ(k) | is the vector obtained by taking the coordinate-wise absolute value of uξ(k) .
Definition 6. The regret of the learning algorithm against the optimal distribution P⋆ ∈
argmaxP {uξ(k) · P} is
B(K) =
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · P
⋆ −
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · qk
Corollary 1 can be used in order to bound the regret. To that end, we first need the following
theorem.
Theorem 3. After K rounds of applying the modified weighted majority algorithm WMA-
SR, for any distribution P it holds:
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · P −
K∑
k=1
uξ(k) · qk ≤ 2
√
logeNK +
K∑
k=1
E
(S)
(k)
Corollary 2. When algorithm WMA-SR is run with parameter ℓ =
√
logeN
K
then the regret
of the algorithm is bound by B(K) ≤ 2
√
logeNK +
∑K
k=1 E
(S)
(k) .
One can also show that the algorithm converges by dividing the time into epochs. A choice
of epochs that gives convergence with probability one is to define the length of each epoch
as Tk = k
2 and then proceed similarly to Freund and Schapire [1999] to show the following
Theorem 4. Suppose we repeat the game for an unbounded number of rounds. Then for
the regret of the algorithm it holds: P
[
B(K)
K
≤ ǫ
]
= 1 for all but a finite number of values
of K and for every ǫ > 0.
View as a bandit problem. To avoid uniformly sampling all policies, we could cast this
as a contextual bandit problem, mapping the prior ξk selected at each round by nature to
the context. With a slight modification of the linear context bandit algorithm presented
in Auer [2002], we then obtain a similar bound, which is however linear in the number of
policies, making this approach impractical. Since our estimates converge to the values of
the policies, we can recover the value of the game if Nature uses fictitious play with respect
to our estimates [Vrieze and Tijs, 1982].
4 Conclusion
We have discussed the links between robust reinforcement learning and maximin policies.
In particular, an interesting idea to explore is to use maximin policies against a constrained
set of priors Ξφ. Such as set is easy to define for a finite number of MDPs. However, to put
the idea into practice we also need to establish computational procedures for approximately
calculating such policies. Although this seems to be achievable for small problems, there
does not appear to be a useful procedure for larger ones. One potential direction would be
to choose statistics Φ that inherently make the problem amenable to simple solutions.
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